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This thesis will develop connections between the decomposition of binaries in the
cognitive linguistic model of prototype theory and the deconstructionism of binaries in the
literary critical theory of deconstructionism, focusing on Tom Stoppard’s The Real Inspector
Hound to show the operation of the theory in literature and using on Stoppard’s Arcadia as an
example of an application of prototype theory as a critical lens. Prototype theory is a
linguistically and psychologically-based theory of categorization which rejects the definition of
categorization found in classical theory. Deconstructionism is a reaction to and a partial rejection
of structuralism, and teaches that language deconstructs itself through the breakdown of binaries
and through a focus on the assumptions made within a text. Both these theories break down the
binary conceptualizations in language set up by former theories, while avoiding anti-order by a
continued use of binaries in different ways or by a re-ordering into new binaries or into
multiplicities.
Stoppard, who is often defined as a poststructuralist writer, has often been viewed
through the lens of deconstructionism critical theory.1However, his texts have not before been
viewed through the lens of the similar transdisciplinary theory of prototypical categorizations.
This thesis will use The Real Inspector Hound as an example of binary breakdown through the
text’s overt discussion of binaries, and Arcadia as an example of prototype theory textual

1 See Antor, Heinz. "The Arts, the Sciences, and the M aking o f Meaning: Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia as a PostStructuralist Play." Anglia - Zeitschrift für englische Philologie 116.3 (2009): 326-354. Print., Hooti, Noorbakhsh,
and Samaneh Shooshtarian. "A Postmodernist Reading o f Tom Stoppard's Arcadia." Studies in Literature and
Language.7 (2010): 13. Web., Jernigan, Daniel K. "A British Stage o f the Postmodern: Theatre as Cultural Capital
in Tom Stoppard and Caryl Churchill." Ph.D. Purdue University, 2001. United States— Indiana: Web., Jernigan,
Daniel. "Tom Stoppard and 'Postmodern Science': Normalizing Radical Epistemologies in Hapgood and Arcadia."
Comparative Drama 37 (2003): 3-35. Web., Lau, King. “Postmodern Performance in Tom Stoppard's Travesties and
Arcadia.” University o f Hong Kong (Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong), 2003; OCLC. Web., and Martyniuk, Irene.
"'This is Not Science. This is Story-Telling': The Place o f the Individual and the Community in A. S. Byatt's
Possession and Tom Stoppard's Arcadia." CLIO (2004): 265. Web.
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analysis through a discussion of the prototypicality of the different kinds of love portrayed in this
text.
The Robin and the Penguin: The History of Prototype Theory
The classical theory of categorization and the semantic understanding of concepts
remained in place for hundreds of years.2 Aristotle in ancient Greece posited a binary
understanding of concepts based on necessary and sufficient conditions. This meant that “an
entity represents a category member by virtue of fulfilling a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions...called ‘necessary and sufficient’ because they are individually necessary but only
collectively sufficient to define a category.”3 Within classical theory, entities are considered to
be a part of a category if they meet these conditions and to be outside of a category if they do
not. A more recent version of these necessary and sufficient conditions is Katz and Fodor’s
analysis of bachelor in 19634, in which members of the category ‘bachelor’ are entities that meet
the conditions of being human, male, and unmarried.5 However, identifying “a precise set of
conditions that are necessary and sufficient to define a category” proves exceedingly difficult in
practice. Classical categorization theory also ignores prototypicality effects present in human
categorization like degrees of membership—meaning that classical theory does not recognize
any member of a category as a better example of that category than any other member.
Categories are conceptualized as binary; an entity is either a member of a category, or it is not.

2 This classical theory is based on Western classical logic. Eastern forms o f logic are in some ways more tolerant o f
contradictions and are more likely to readily break the Law o f Non-contradiction set up in Western logical rules.
This means that Eastern logic is less likely to have binaries present.
3 Evans, Vyvyan, and Melanie Green, “Chapter 8: Categorization and Idealised Cognitive Models,” Cognitive
Linguistics: An Introduction, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006, LC2, the library catalog. Web. 8 Sept.
2 0 1 4 , p .251.
4 Katz, Jerrold J. and Jerry A Fodor. 1963, “The Structure o f a Semantic Theory,” Language, 39, 170-210.
5 Geeraerts, Dirk. Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings, EBSCO: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006, Web. 8 Sept, 2014, p.
142.
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The development of an alternative cognitive model of categorization, which would
correct the weaknesses and inconsistencies found in the classical theory, was finally begun by
Wittgenstein, postulated clearly by Rosch, and expanded and further explained by a wide range
of scholars but most primarily by Lakoff and Jackendoff. Today, prototype theory is a wideranging series of interconnected propositions that all center around a complete cognitive model
which argues that the reality of the way that information and concepts are categorized is not held
up by the classical theory.
With his game theory in a passage in his Philosophical Investigations, the philosopher
Wittgenstein in the 1950s first began the discussion of the issues found in classical categorization
theory that would eventually lead to the development of prototype theory. In this passage he
attempts to define the term ‘game’ using necessary and sufficient conditions, but finds instead
that the many examples of games are connected by an intertwining series of qualities at the
structural level, and that one game might not have anything in common with another.6 For
example, many games involve other people, but games like handball and solitaire do not. There
is a whole subcategory of games that require active movement, and yet many games can be
played sitting down around a deck of cards. In short, there is not set of necessary and sufficient
conditions, which would be required for a classical categorizational understanding, that can be
used to describe the category of games. At this point Wittgenstein develops and argues for a
concept he calls “family resemblances” as the underlying structure of the category ‘game’ and,
by extension, other categories that do not fit into the classical model.7 Wittgenstein urges his
readers to

6 Taylor, John R, Linguistic Categorization,2nd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, Print, p. 38
7 Taylor 39
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look and see whether there is anything common to all…And the result of this
examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and
criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I
can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family
resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build,
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the
same way.8
Wittgenstein recognized the shortcomings inherent in a binary system of categorization where an
object either is or is not part of a category, and sought to remedy it with a new definition of
structure, family resemblances, which would later become the foundational explanation of
structure in prototype theory, as argued by Rosch and Mervis.
Austin, in part responding to Wittgenstein, and also reacting against the issues posed in
classical theory, extended these ideas to the study of words themselves, and this approach
functioned as a precursor to the contemporary understanding of polysemy as prototypical.9
Polysemy deals with the multiple meanings used for many words; for example, the word see is
used in many different ways: “Can I see that?” “Oh, I see” “I can’t see over your head.” For the
these three examples, ‘see’ would mean something similar to holding or touching, understanding,
and visually perceiving, respectively. However, if ‘see’ was defined, most English speakers
would respond with the third meaning, the visual perception of colors and light. This is because
the third definition is the prototypical definition of ‘see,’ and the first two definitions are more
atypical.10 Polysemy is a difficult concept to contend with, because often the various definitions
for words are related, and one must decide exactly what measure of differentiation in usage and
meaning calls for a separate lexical entity of the word. Prototype theory provides a model that
8 Arrington, Robert L. and Hans-Johann Glock, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations [Electronic Resource]:
Text and Context, London: Routledge, 1991, 1991. Web.
9 Lakoff, George, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind, Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, cl 987, 1987, Print, p. 18
10 The relationships between these definitions are also influenced by metaphors, most notably the metaphor o f light
as knowledge, which pairs seeing with understanding, but an explanation o f these is not necessary for the discussion
here. These metaphors are discussed in length in L ak o ff s Metaphors We Live By
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more easily and accurately describes difference in word meanings, since it is able to show the
connections between the meanings as well as the prototypicality effects in word meaning
usage.11
In 1965, this line of thought started by Wittgenstein was aided by Lotfi Zadeh’s technical
development of a theory of fuzzy sets as an addition to standard set theory.12 This new
development of fuzzy sets is another instance of a reaction against a more classical and binary
theory. In classical set theory, every object is placed either inside or outside of a category,
similar to Aristotle’s classical concept of categorization with conditions.13 The development of
fuzzy set theory was a new way to conceive of fuzzy boundaries and is similar to degrees of
memberships, which is a foundational part of prototype theory. Fuzzy set theory is based on the
intersection, the union, and the complement of two categories,14 and recognizes degrees of
membership.15 Later on, in 1978, Kay and McDaniel published a paper in which they argued that
basic color terms and the relations between them are best described in terms as a fuzzy set,
instead of in more classical or Katzian terms of analysis. Kay and McDaniel discuss the
neurophysiological basis of color perception,16 and then plot the four basic hues in terms of fuzzy
set theory, assigning different hues each a number between zero and complete unity with the
basic hues that they have defined, according to Zadeh’s fuzzy set theory.17 The basic color terms,

11 Further examples o f polysemy using prototype theory can be found in Jackendoff ’s (2002) analysis o f ‘clim b’ and
‘in,’ in his Foundations o f Language'. Brain Meaning, Grammar, and Evolution, or in the analysis o f ‘over’ in
L akoff (1987) Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things.
12 Lakoff 22
13 Lakoff 22
14 Lakoff 22
15 Kay, Paul & McDaniel, Chad K., "The Linguistic Significance o f the Meanings o f Basic Colors Terms,"
Language 54.3 (1978): 610-646, Print, p. 621.
16 There are in reality considered to be only four basic color hues, although there are six basic color terms, because
black and white are not considered hues. Kay and McDaniel dealt only with the four major hues in their analysis.
17 This work in fuzzy set theory and its application to color terms is important and relevant because Kay and
M cDaniel’s analysis established color terms as resulting from our cognitive perception o f the world. This proved
that language is non-autonomous and therefore provided evidence for prototype theory as a general cognitive
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since they can be defined as a fuzzy set, also function as a perfect example of a category that
displays prototypicality effects, meaning that some reds, for example, are commonly seen as
better examples of the category red than others, as evidenced in Kay and McDaniel’s argument
for fuzzy set theory as a descriptor. Fire engine red, one feels, is a more basic and better red than
maroon.
With these developments as a background, Eleanor Rosch formed the idea of prototype
theory in a series of papers in the 1970s. Rosch and Mervis conducted six studies that aimed to
develop support for the argument that family resemblances are the structure that defines
prototypical members and less prototypical members in categorization.18 These experiments,
taken together, show that the more attributes that a member has in common with the other
members in that category, the more prototypical that member is, and conversely, the fewer
attributes a member has, the less prototypical a member of that category is. Findings like Rosch
and Mervis’s experiments provide proof that this is how humans conceptualize categories in the
world. This family resemblance can be used as a structural basis for prototype theory, explaining
why some members are considered prototypical and others are not.19 Simply put, Rosch’s
prototype theory argues that a robin, because it has more qualities in common with other birds, is

process. The non-autonomous nature o f language means that language does not exist alone: it is irreversibly
connected to and intertwined with other cognitive thought processes. In short, color terms are an example o f
language based in other physical processes, which means that language does not function autonomously.
18 The first and third studies had subjects list attributes for members in categories that had previously been rated for
degrees o f membership in that category. Experiments two and four had subjects list superordinates o f these members
and attributes o f contrasting superordinate categories. In experiments five and six, artificial categories (arbitrary
strings o f letters) were used to show that family resemblances positively affected ease o f learning and positive
reaction times for subjects.
19 Rosch, Eleanor, and Carolyn B Mervis, "Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure o f Categories,"
Cognitive Psychology 7(1975): 573-605. Print, p. 599.
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a better or more prototypical member of the category bird than a penguin, which shares fewer
qualities with other category members.20
Rosch is considered the founder of prototype theory and made explicit many of its most
important foundations: namely, the existence of degrees of membership and family resemblances
as the creators of the structure of a category defined by prototype theory. However, the theory
has many far-reaching and interdisciplinary applications, since it can be thought of as a general
cognitive process of categorization, instead of a strictly linguistic theory. Both George Lakoff
and Ray Jackendoff have expanded upon prototype theory by introducing further semantic
structures and applications. Lakoff discussed the idea of his Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs),
and Jackendoff developed an elaborate theory of semantic components which functions similarly
to syntax structure like X-bar or Government and Binding theory.
Lakoff contends in his book Woman, Fire, and Dangerous Things that “we organize our
knowledge by means of structures called idealized cognitive models, and that category structures
and prototype effects are by-products of that organization.”21 Essentially, Lakoff provides ICMs
as the source that gives rise to prototypicality effects in categorization. These ICMs are
“relatively stable mental representations that represent theories about the world.”22 ICMs are
built on background knowledge about the world23 and they are idealized because they represent a
range of experiences rather than specific ones. Lakoff argues that both his ICMs and the
20 Degrees o f membership reflects Rosch’s belief that “division o f the world into categories is not arbitrary” but is a
result o f human cognitive processes, and confirms W ittgenstein’s argument that formal criteria— necessary and
sufficient conditions— are not necessary, since categorical relationship can be defined in terms o f family
resemblances. The W horf-Sapir hypothesis states that thought is formed and shaped by language, and that the
language one speaks is therefore integral in the creation o f one’s thought process. Rosch also reiterates this
argument against language as autonomous or as being controlled by thought in the Whorfi an sense in her review o f
linguistic relativity, in which she uses color terms and the structures in language to support the idea that language is
formed from reality.
21 Lakoff 68
22 Evans and Green 270
23 This is similar to Fillm ore’s theory o f frames in semantics.
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clustering of these ICMs function as the source and the underlying structure that gives way to
prototypicality effects. For example, our prototypical version of ‘bachelor’—an unmarried man
of a certain age who lives alone, is not involved with anyone, and does not belong in the
clergy—is based on a society which has expectations about marriage and the marriageable age.24
The more prototypical a bachelor appears, the closer the ICM fits our knowledge about the
world. For his argument for cluster models showing typicality effects, Lakoff uses the many
different conceptions of a mother (birth mother, genetic mother, nurturing mother, etc.) to show
that the ideal and prototypical mother would be considered the one that fits into all of these
categories. Therefore, the prototypical mother exists at the convergence or the clustering of all of
the various models. Each mother is considered a mother by its relation to this ideal or
prototypical model.25
Jackendoff also focuses on what he calls encyclopedic knowledge and its
interdependence with linguistic meaning.26 He uses a simple example to support this idea: what
we would term a “small elephant” is in reality bigger than what we would call a “big mouse,”
which means that the categories of big and small are in part determined by our knowledge of the
standard sizes of these animals, our encyclopedic knowledge. This interdependence means that
“necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be stated because of a blurred and/or contextdependent boundary.”27 Jackendoff also discusses and breaks down the individual words ‘climb’
and ‘in’ in a way similar to Lakoff s breakdown of the word ‘mother.’ He concludes that these
words are built out of what he calls cluster concepts: “thus we see again the characteristic non-

24 Lakoff 70
25 L akoff 76
26 Jackendoff, Ray, Foundations o f Language: Brain Meaning, Grammar, and Evolution, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002, Print, p. 352.
27 Jackendoff 352
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Boolean interaction of conditions to form a cluster concept…Concepts organized this way…are
combinations of conditions.”28 Jackendoff and Lakoff both contend that our conception and
categorization of words is built up from an interdependent interconnected web of meanings,
drawing from both encyclopedic or background knowledge and from linguistic meaning.
The Contemporary Web
This history and development of prototype theory leads to a contemporary model with
many components and a web of sub-theories and expansions. The most important and relevant
parts of prototype theory to the discussion are degrees of membership, and the underlying web of
constructions that create word meaning, defined in part by Wittgenstein’s family resemblances,
Lakoff’s ICMs, and Jackendoff s cluster concepts. These tenets are primary components of
prototype theory, and they are similar to deconstructionism’s theory of word meaning.
When simplified, family resemblances, Lakoff s ICMs, and Jackendoff s cluster concepts
play similar roles in prototype theory. All three act as sources or underlying structures with
prototypicality as the identifiable result. While Lakoff s ICMs and Jackendoff s cluster concepts
are more defined by and connected to background or encyclopedic information and semantic
frames, all three theories use cluster models as the source of prototypicality. Essentially, they all
describe the idea that the more characteristics an object or concept has in common with the rest
of the members in that category, the better an example, or the more prototypical an example, that
object or concept is for that category. Conversely, the less an object has in common with a
category, the less prototypical that object becomes. Most importantly, this base for
prototypicality effects means that there is no fixed foundation on which categories are based.
Every object in a category is judged on its relation to the other objects in that category, instead of

28 Jackendoff 353
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on fixed or predetermined conditions. Fundamentally, objects are defined only by their relations
instead of against an outside standard of conditions. The source of prototypicality effects as a
cluster model is one connection that prototype theory makes with deconstructionism.
Lakoff’s and Jackendoff’s models for sources of prototypicality effects also take into
account the background or encyclopedic knowledge and its interplay and interdependence with
linguistic meaning. Both ICMs and cluster concepts posit that one’s conception and
categorization of a word or of a category member is in part dependent on the knowledge that one
has about the world. As Lakoff states, the prototypicality effects present in members of the
category of bachelor, which was formerly thought a good example of Katzian categorization, are
due to social or background knowledge like the average marrying age and even the concept of
marriage. This acknowledgement of linguistic meaning as dependent on social constructs is a
primary point in deconstructionism.
The single most important and defining notion in prototype theory is the notion of
degrees of membership. Prototype theory most essentially argues that the boundaries between
categories are fuzzy, and that it is possible for one object to be a better member of a category
than another. This is radically opposed to the binary categorization of Aristotelian and Katzian
categorizational theory. It breaks down that binary understanding of human cognitive
categorization by introducing the idea of gray areas in categories. Instead of binary categories,
degrees of membership describes overlapping categories defined not by lines but by a fading out
as members become less prototypical. This portion of prototype theory is the most overt example
of partial binary breakdown and can be seen in the practice of deconstruction as well as the
discussion of binaries within The Real Inspector Hound.
Chains of Signifieds
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Deconstructionism is first a reaction against the literary criticism theory of structuralism,
which seeks to develop and reveal “underlying structure and the principles that govern their
composition.” This theory recognizes as its founder Ferdinand de Saussure, who taught that
language is arbitrary in the sounds it uses to represent ideas. An English speaker, for example,
may contend that there is something inherently victorious, triumphant, or divine in the
phonology of the word ‘glory,’ but a speaker of the German language finds no such connection.
Even onomatopoeias, Saussure says, are different across languages and not realistically
representative of natural sounds. A dog’s bark, for example, might be ‘woof’or ‘ruff’in English,
while it is ‘waouh’ in French and ‘ham’ in Romanian. Saussure also first created the concept of
the langue and the parole, which function as the deeper meaning and the surface phenomena of a
word, respectively. Another way of writing this formula is the sign is the sum of the signifier and
the signified.
Deconstructionism takes structuralism’s attempts at finding underlying meanings or
structures and proclaims that these meanings are naturally or “always already” broken down due
to the relative web of interconnected meanings, including those of social constructs, that words
are built upon. Deconstructionist or postmodern (the terms will here be used interchangeably)
literature deals existentially with the lack of meaning in life and in language. Deconstructionism
postulates that language is slippery and changeable. For example, in English many words can be
used interchangeably as verbs or nouns; English lends itself to this pattern of linguistic
conversion. This means that, since a word can either be a verb or a noun, it can be read
syntactically differently and is therefore ambiguous, which supports deconstructionism’s view of
a changing and slippery language. Syntactic and semantic ambiguity from linguistic theories can29
29 Tyson, Lois, "Deconstructive Criticism." Critical Theory Today: A User-Friendly Guide, 2nd Ed. New York:
Routledge, 2006, Print, p. 209.
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describe the ambiguity that deconstructionism recognizes, discusses, and uses to develop its
theory and criticism.
Deconstructionism also rewrites the structuralist formula, meaning that a word is really
an accumulation of all of our associations with that word—a chain of signifíeds. The
accumulation of these identifiers and connections that we make creates the idealized concept in
our minds of the object. According to deconstructionism, these idealized versions of concepts
that are built up by interconnections of meaning, both linguistic and social, indicates that any
word meaning is the sum of all of the uses of that world, and that any combination of words is
not just the sum of those word meanings but necessarily involves the interactions of those
meanings to give the sum of how those words function together. The deconstructionist
conceptualization of words and word combinations as dependent on a web of interconnected
linguistic and social meaning and information is similar to the cluster models that Lakoff and
Jackendoff posit as a source for prototypicality effects in categorization of words. Both argue for
idealized or representative versions of concepts as a way of perception, and for meaning as built
on interactions between multiple conceptions and the interdependence of linguistic meaning and
social or background knowledge. In order to show this structure present, deconstructionist
criticism looks at the binary oppositions present in the text and the structure of privilege given to
one side of the binary, and aims to shows how the language naturally deconstructs itself as the
superficially binary oppositions break down and the privilege becomes subverted.
Derrida, who can be called the founder of deconstructionist theory, argued that language
can be defined by two concepts: the signifieds postpone meaning and, more importantly, this
meaning comes from the difference we find between words and word meanings. For Derrida, this
difference in meaning is the only meaning that language can have, and he coins his difference
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“différance,” using a play on the French words for differing and deferring. Derrida and
deconstructionism admit our dependence on language, but use this analysis of its faults to
determine that we can use language in new ways in order to easily develop new meanings.
Robins are Birdy Birds
Prototype theory and deconstructionism function and argue so similarly that they can
almost be viewed as the same theory taking on different forms across disciplines. Similarly,
prototype theory can be likened to paraconsistent30 logic forms in philosophy and can be shown
to have much in common with the contemporary understanding of quantum physics. There is a
general tendency across the board towards an attempt at new models that allow for the messiness
of reality and away from old models defined by classical logic. These new models strive to allow
for the breakdown of binaries without a total breakdown into meaninglessness. Prototype theory
and deconstruction both do this by breaking down binaries in order to set up multiplicities, or
sometimes in the case of deconstructionism, to set up new binaries. These two theories relate
most importantly in their reactions, the new structures they set in place, their breakdown of
binaries, and their application to polysemy.
Both prototype theory and deconstructionism were begun as reactions: prototype theory
as a reaction against classical theory and deconstructionism as a reaction against structuralism.
This is important for the theories themselves and for the connection between them, because it
means that the background of both theories was a structure set in place that did not accurately
reflect reality. For prototype theory, the Aristotelian method of categorization posed many
problems: it did not account for exemplars or for degrees of membership, both of which exist in
real cognitive processes, it had no way to deal with “damaged” objects like a three-legged dog,
30 A form o f logic where something can be both true and untrue at the same time, or one that breaks the rule in
classical logic o f non-contradiction. This logic can be used to deal with paradoxes.
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and the strict binary categories were unable to describe many categories like Wittgenstein’s
games. The classical categorization theory, which was presumed to be true based on assumptions
about categories, did not accurately describe the reality of human cognitive categorization.
Prototype theory reacted against this basis in order to develop a new structural theory with rules
that more accurately reflected how humans categorize objects, words, and concepts. In the same
way, deconstructionism’s precursor, structuralism, seeks the underlying structures of words in
terms of langue and parole, while deconstructionism aims to replace these structures with the
messier but more accurate descriptor of a series of interrelated signifieds that cluster together to
form concepts. Both theory’s source and purpose is replacing old structures with more chaotic
yet accurate theories.
Reflections and similarities can be drawn between the new structures that each set in
place as the source for cognitive categorization. The proposed structures that function as the
source for prototypicality effects in categories are family resemblances and Lakoff’s ICMs, or
Jackendoff’s similar cluster concepts. These structures operate on a clustering of different
qualities. This understanding of categorization relies on the clustering of qualities both linguistic
and social to create the fully sum of the meaning of a word. Deconstructionism’s replacement
model for understanding word relations is analogous to these cluster models.
Deconstructionism’s theory of chains of signifieds can be seen as another version of the cluster
models proposed by prototype theory. In the same way that qualities cluster together to describe
the prototypicality of an object or concept, deconstructionism teaches that associations made
from social context connect, intertwine, and cluster together to form the full and idealized
conception of a word. Both theories replace models described by binary relations with models
that deal with the clustering and intertwining of a bevy of different but associated ideas.
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Prototype theory, in its idea of degrees of membership, takes the binary distinctions
between categories and introduces the idea of fuzzy boundaries as a descriptor of human
conception. It takes apart the barrier between “A” and “not A” through its insistence that some
objects may be “sort of A,” “very A,” or “very not A.” Essentially, the former binary conception
of categories is destroyed to make way for a conception that is based instead on multiplicities.
The evidence for prototypicality means that we define things not only by their opposite but by
comparison with a series of alike and unalike objects. Prototype theory replaces binary opposites
with multiplicities.
Deconstructionism relates to this tenet of prototype theory in two separate ways: its own
overt breakdown of binaries and Derrida’s différence. The process of a basic deconstructionist
application to a literary text includes seeking a binary opposition that exists in the text,
determining the side of the binary that holds the power (the privileged), and then subverting that
privilege in order to show that the binary does not truly exist in the text because of the natural
tendency of language towards deconstructionism due to its slippery and ambiguous nature.
Deconsructionism, therefore, operates against the binaries present to break them down, replacing
the former meaning binary with multiplicities or with another binary.
Prototype theory and deconstructionism reflect each other in the breaking down of
binaries, but also in the reordering of concepts. The binaries do not break down into chaos, but
into multiplicities with traceable relations. And in different ways, prototype theory and
deconstructionism both require binaries. Deconstructionism operates against a background of
assumed binaries in the text; the searching and finding of binaries is a necessary step in the
application of deconstructionism to a text. Deconstruction, therefore, requires binaries in order to
deconstruct. In the same way, prototype uses binaries in its application, since the degree of
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membership, or the amount of prototypicality, of a member is determined by creating what is a
essentially a checklist of traits that appear to be common across the category. This sort of
checklist is similar to a list of necessary and sufficient conditions, but the difference between the
two systems is that the items in the checklist for prototype theory determine degrees of
membership instead of functioning as requirements for that category.
An example of this sort of prototype theory application would be determining the
prototypicality of birds. Traits common in birds would include a small size, feathers, three-toed
feet, a chirping sound, wings, and an s-shape. A checklist of these categories would be designed
in order to show how many of these traits would apply to various kinds of birds. A robin, for
example, which is considered to be an exemplar, or a very prototypical example, of the bird
category, would have all of these featured checked off. A penguin, by contrast, which is
considered to be a worse or less prototypical example of a bird, would have only wings marked
off. In this way, prototypicality is shown through a system of binaries. Below is an example of
such a binary breakdown.
Member

Small Size

Robin
Penguin

Y

Feathers
Y
Y

Three-toed
feet
Y

Chirping
sound
Y

Wings
Y
Y

S-shape
Y

Lastly, prototype theory and deconstructionism deal similarly with the conception of
individual words. Prototype theory, as previously mentioned, allow for a new understanding and
provides a better model for the occurrence of polysemy (multiple conceptual entities associated
with a single word) by allowing for prototypicality effects at the level of individual words. When
a single word can be used in multiple different ways, with multiple conceptual meanings,
prototype theory provides a model for the relations between these meanings, instead of defining
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the separation of one meaning from another, and is able to show which word meaning and uses
are more prototypical. Much of polysemy is based on metaphoric language, as in the case of the
aforementioned ‘see,’ which has some of its meanings based on the metaphor of seeing as
understanding, paralleled by words like ‘illuminate’ and ‘enlighten.’ This metaphoric nature
present in words is necessary for an understanding of the ambiguities present in literature.
Additionally, this multiplicity of meanings present in one word is similar to the chain of
signifieds that is present behind the conceptualization of every word according to
deconstructionism: every word contains a build-up of multiple meaning, understandings, and
associations, many of which are metaphoric.
While the similarities present in these two approaches are substantial, binary oppositions
as conceived of in deconstructionist theory are slightly different from binary categorization in
prototype theory. While prototype theory’s binaries can be defined by the “A/not A” distinction,
deconstructionism’s binary oppositions are more properly defined as opposites. In other words,
prototype theory’s binaries would be described as “white/not white” whereas
deconstructionism’s would be described “white/black.” The distinction is a minor one, but it is
important to note that the prototype theory definition of binaries is more technically clear and
closer to binaries defined by logic, though they are also narrower.
Keeping the Space Warm in The Real Inspector Hound
Tom Stoppard’s plays have often been paired with deconstructionism as a literary theory,
and Stoppard himself has been called a postmodernist. Although his plays have not been looked
at from the standpoint of prototype theory, they have lent themselves to transdisciplinary theories
in the past, especially theoretical particle physics and philosophy.

31 For examples see note 39.

Stoppard tends to employ
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real concepts found in physics or other sciences in the characters and the interactions in his
plays, which means that Stoppard’s plays use concepts in the worlds of science and philosophy
and bring them into the human world.
In Stoppard’s The Real Inspector Hound, he deals with pairing and the definition of
binaries overtly while at the same time breaking the binary between the real and unreal, the
audience and the play world. This sort of metatheatre makes The Real Inspector Hound an ideal
candidate for analysis by both deconstructionism and prototype theory, as the play has a dual
dealing with binaries. The Real Inspector Hound shows the similarities between these two
theories, particularly the most primary similarity of challenging binary understandings.
Though prototype theory and deconstructionism in many ways function as different
versions of the same questions and conclusions, different replacement models for word meaning,
they do have one major difference: prototype theory, because of its mathematical basis, more
clearly provides a conceptual model replacement, whereas deconstructionism and particularly
literature that is described as deconstructionist can sometimes tend to wax towards existentialism
and the claim that there is no meaning. Beckett’s famous Waitingfor Godot is a prime example
of this questioning and eventual conclusion of no meaning. Derrida did provide a new partial
model with his différence, where language meaning is dependent only on the differences between
words, but overall the focus of deconstructionism is on bringing down the structures of
structuralism in order to show that there is no structure. As Demasíes claims in his essay about
Stoppard as a proto-Chaotician, there is a split between the old order that depends on logic based
still in Aristotelian thinking and the new anti-order of deconstructionist and postmodern works.3
2
However, a new kind of order, one that describes the world in a contemporary viewpoint, with
32 Demastes, William W, "Portrait o f an Artist as Proto-Chaotician: Tom Stoppard Working His Way to Arcadia."
Narrative, 2(2011): 229. Web. p. 230.
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allowances for our admittance of subjectivity and the fuzzy areas, has not risen up to replace the
old order. The quantum physics and paraconsistent logic of literary theory is missing. Prototype
theory, because of its combination of a focus on language and a mathematical background, could
provide this type of breakdown into a more chaotic structure within literary criticism.
In his essay, Demastes describes Tom Stoppard as trying to create something in between
the more realistic and classically logical works and the anti-order postmodern works. He turns
away from the old models while keeping “an insistence that an implicit structure exists which
prevents total disorder and forever increasing entropy,” a major theme in Stoppard’s more
famously known play Arcadia.33 Stoppard searches for a model that allows for chaos, and his
later interests in chaos theory and quantum physics bring him closer to this new definition of
order. Prototype theory is one such example of the redefined order which reinstates structures
within a contemporary view without wholly abandoning or rejecting structure.
Stoppard’s plays have a habit of working as “thought experiments.” Both Demastes and
Clive discuss them as “plays that function like thought experiments and that question and
challenge the presumptions we have allowed to underlie our habituated ways of looking at the
world.”34 Arcadia, for example, deals with and questions entropy, the descent into chaos, and
thermodynamics. The Real Inspector Hound has a more linear plot structure in terms of
chronology, but it too deals with upending preconceived notions. Most obviously, The Real
Inspector Hound seeks to break down notions of the typical clichéd version of the mystery play.
It focuses on the plot, and on surprising the audience in the typical way: with who did the
mystery. Of course, Stoppard’s play breaks down barriers with this plot structure, creating a
duplicity of audience and a framed story by placing two of his characters in the audience within
33 Demastes 231
34 Demastes 231
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the play, as critics of the murder mystery that occurs as a play within a play. By doing this,
Stoppard is able to break the barrier between reality and stage while still remaining contained on
the stage. And it is this breakdown between the critics and their play that enables Stoppard to
create a new twist in a plot structure that is defined by surprise and clichéd twists. This overt
breakdown of binaries in the text mirrors prototype theory; prototype theory breaks down
binaries into multiplicities, and The Real Inspector Hound provides a sort of model or example
for this breakdown and reordering.
On a larger level, Stoppard’s play deals with the breakdown of the binary of the real and
the unreal, which is a common theme found in postmodern literature and especially theater,
where it is easier to break the boundary between the play and the audience. Stoppard, of course,
does this in new ways. His play begins when “the audience appears to be confronted by their
own reflection in a huge mirror. Impossible.”35 The Real Inspector Hound captures a play within
a play structure, following the audience of a murder mystery play as they critique it. Throughout
The Real Inspector Hound, however, the two critics become involved in the plot of the play. First
Birdboot and then Moon are drawn in, answering the phone ringing on stage, and then playing
out the same scenes they have just seen, with similar dialogue and actions. It is when the dead
figure that has been lying on the stage throughout both plays is revealed that it becomes apparent
how intertwined the play within the play and the real life within the play are.
Stoppard succeeds in uprooting preconceived notions in terms of plot structure. But of
greater importance is the subtler dealing with binaries that run through the character relations and
through the structure of reality and stage. The Real Inspector Hound converses with binaries in
these two different ways. The character description comes in some of the first lines in the play,

35 Stoppard, Tom, The Real Inspector Hound, New York: Grove Press, 1968, Print, p. 5.
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when Moon, one of the critics, laments his secondary nature as a critic—essentially, his place as
the unprivileged side of the binary. Characteristic of Stoppard, Moon’s description of his place in
the binary makes its way into more technical description and ponderings. The other critic,
Birdboot, wrapped up in his own thoughts, repeatedly and comically asks Moon where Higgs,
the “first string” critic, is, which Moon answers with a series complaints over his condition.
MOON: It is as if we only existed one at a time, combining to achieve continuity.
I keep space warm for Higgs. My presence defines his absence, his absence
confirms my presence, his presence precludes mine... When Higgs and I walk
down this aisle together to claim our common seat, the oceans will fall into the
sky and the trees will hang with fishes.
BIRDBOOT : (he has not been paying attention, looking around vaguely, now
catches up) Where’s Higgs?
MOON: The very sight of me with a complimentary ticket is enough…It will
follow me to my grave and become my epitaph—Here lies Moon the second
string: where’s Higgs?...sometimes I dream of revolution, a bloody coup d ’etat by
the second rank...Sometimes I dream of Higgs.36
This is an early establishment of a clearly defined binary, in the terms of prototype theory,
defined not simply as opposites but in the form “A/not A.” Moon’s speech reveals that if the
boundaries of this binary were ever to be questioned or broken down, the world would descend
into saturnalia of the Shakespearian sense, since nature would be turned on its head. The binary
then, at least for Moon, upholds the structure of the world. The other point here, more closely
related to deconstructionism’s approach, is the emphasis on the unprivileged side of the binary,
and the dream of what is basically a deconstructionist literary critique: the revolution of the
unprivileged in the binary and a reversing and overthrowing of the structure, which also leads to
chaos.
However, the perceived structure of the binary begins to breakdown within the play, done
first through Moon himself, when he begins to discuss the third element of the supposed binary:

36 Stoppard 6
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MOON (ruminating quietly): I think I must be waiting for Higgs to die.
BIRDBOOT: What?
MOON: Half afraid that I will vanish when he does.
(The phone rings. SIMON picks it up.)
SIMON: Hello?
MOON: I wonder if it’s the same for Puckeridge?
BIRDBOOT AND SIMON (together): Who?
MOON: Third string.
BIRDBOOT: Your stand-in?
MOON: Does he wait for Higgs and I to write each other’s obituary—does he
dream— ?37
The introduction of Puckeridge is immensely significant in terms of studying binary structure:
now it becomes apparent that what Moon has described as a binary existence is no real binary at
all. The binary structure Moon attempts to define breaks down into multiplicities when reality is
looked at as a whole. And in the play’s end, it is this shadowy third string figure that triumphs in
an unlikely chain of events. Puckeridge attempts the coup d ’etat that Moon only dreams of,
killing Moon and Higgs, and taking the role of the real Inspector Hound:
MAGNUS: Yes!—I am the real Inspector Hound!
MOON (pause): Puckeridge!
MAGNUS (with pistol): Stand where you are, or I shoot!
MOON (backing): Puckeridge! You killed Higgs—and Birdboot tried to tell me—
CYNTHIA: So you are the real Inspector Hound.
MAGNUS: Not only that!—I have been leading a double life—at least!38
Here Puckeridge/Magnus describes a central theme in the play: at least a double life, but most
likely more. He is describing the breakdown of binaries within one person, another level of the
breakdown within the play. Puckeridge, in his existence and his victory, functions as a bringer of
ordered chaos and a breaker of binaries in the play.
In terms of the three characters—Higgs, Moon, and Puckeridge—and their operations
together, the binary structures are left ambiguous. At the end of the play all three are brought
37 Stoppard 13
38 Stoppard 44
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together—indeed, Higgs has actually been present in the entirety of the play, as the dead body on
the stage of the play that Moon is critiquing. So Moon’s point about his presence precluding
Higgs’ absence is questioned: does it matter if Higgs is dead? How does Puckeridge exist in this
defined binary? But another of Moon’s points is answered: Higgs dies, and he ceases to exist
shortly thereafter. The third string, however, does not. He continues on. The complex relations
between these three characters are messy are unable to be defined by Moon’s first explanation,
which is rooted in the classical understandings of binaries and categorization. On this character
level, The Real Inspector Hound shows binaries breaking down into multiplicities and binaries
that are not able to be categorized cleanly—ones that require further definition. The relations
between these three characters leads us to a search for the redefinition of binary categorizational
models, which in turn leads to prototype theory. The Real Inspector Hound can be viewed as a
model or an example of the breakdown of the binaries from the classical theory into meaning
based on complex, multiple emotions.
Stoppard’s The Real Inspector Hound functions as a thought experiment in which he
most obviously questions and parodies the typical plot of a murder mystery, and where he also
questions the definition of binaries and the naturalness of their breakdown. Stoppard’s play both
reflects and questions the breakdown of binary categories in reality. The breakdown of binaries
into multiplicities, argued by prototype theory, deconstructionism, and Stoppard’s play, as well
as many more modem and contemporary fields of study, means that the natural human
perception of objects and concepts is dependent on and described by family resemblances or,
similarly, ICMs. Conceptions are based on relativity, but not on binary opposition.
It is because these concepts are based on relativity that The Real Inspector Hound is able
to upend notions of reality. The purposed binary structure of reality at the play’s beginning exists
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between the two critics, who are living in the ‘real’ world, and the characters on the stage, who
are acting. Because it is not a performance in the sense that it is on stage, the world of the critics
Moon and Birdboot at first seem to be more real than the reality of the other characters, who act
as part of this play. This is because our more prototypical conception of reality is that it is not a
performance, that there is something genuine about these people and the world that they live in.
Because this prototypical conception of reality has the trait of an occurrence that has not been
constructed by performance, this world appears more real.
It is this comparison between the two proposed realities within the play, and the
acknowledgement of one reality as a better prototype of reality in that category, that creates
meaning within The Real Inspector Hound. Because one of the realities in the play was
conceived of as less real than the other, the two different realities in the play were seen as binary
and contrasting, and therefore when the plot moves forward into a mixing of the supposed
opposition between reality and performance, the reader or viewer of The Real Inspector Hound is
thrown off by the mixing of a preconceived binary opposition. The breaking down of binary
oppositions, then, is dependent both on a comparison between two different realities and on an
understanding of the prototypicality of each of these different proposed realities. Knowing that
one reality—that of Moon and Birdboot—is more prototypical lends the reader to believe that,
by contrast, the performed stage reality is fake. This mixing of the supposed binary breaks down
those assumptions, and therefore the comparison between the two realities within the play leads
to the idea that reality is inherently a performance.
This breakdown and mixture of the binary of reality versus performance also dissolves
into a multiplicity, since the comparison between the ‘real’ world in the play and the performed
world leads the reader to consider a comparison between the ‘real’ world outside of the play and
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the realities within it. The mixture of reality and performance within the play, then, causes the
reader to consider a breakdown of the real/performed binary in the world outside of the play.
The Attraction that Newton Left Out in Arcadia
Published theories and criticism of Stoppard’s Arcadia have not dealt with prototype
theory as a critical lens before for this text. Stoppard’s Arcadia has been viewed from a
deconstructionist or postmodern viewpoint, as well as from various more scientific lenses. Since
the play is focused around chaos theory and is often cited as a result of Stoppard’s reading of
Gleick’s Chaos: Making a New Science, the play has also been looked at from the lens of chaos
theory and from the viewpoint of quantum physics, which is similar.39 In order to look at Arcadia
from a prototype theory lens, this paper will use Lakoff s ‘mother’ ICM and the binary checklist
as examples and techniques to look at the different definitions of romantic love within the text,
and how these different kinds of love drive the plot.
Lakoff s version of a cluster model, ICMs, similar to Wittgenstein’s family resemblances
and Jackendoff s cluster concepts, attempts to describe the underlying structure that gives rise to
effects of prototypicality in categories. For his argument for cluster models showing typicality
effects, Lakoff uses the many different conceptions of a mother to show that the ideal and
prototypical mother would be considered the one that fits into all of these categories. He first
attempts to define mother using a single definition, but he fails to do so, because “no such
definition will cover the full range of cases. Mother is a concept that is based on a complex
model in which a number of cognitive models combine, forming a cluster model.”40 Since the
concept of mother cannot be defined by one set of conditions, Lakoff develops several

39 See M iller’s “From Fears o f Entrophy to Comfort in Chaos,” Vees-Gulani’s “Flidden Order in the ‘Stoppard Set’,”
Demastes’ “Portrait o f an Artist as Proto-Chaotician,” and Powell’s “Dualism is the Word.”
40 Lakoff 74
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definitions of mother, in order to fully cover the concept. The types that Lakoff outlines are as
follows:
“—The birth model: The person who gives birth is the mother.
...

—The genetic model: The female who contributes the genetic material is the
mother.
—The nurturance model: The female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the
mother of that child.
—The marital model: The wife of the father is the mother.
—The genealogical model: The closest female ancestor is the mother.”41
Since ‘mother’ cannot be defined with a single set of conditions, we move past the binary
division of ‘mother’ and ‘not-mother’ into a multiplicity of different but overlapping
definitions.42 The concept of a “real” mother is dependent on choosing one of these definitions
over the others, and “when the cluster of models that jointly characterize a concept diverge, there
is still a strong pull to view one as the most important.”43 However, the idealized version of the
mother is only found where these disparate definitions overlap with one another, where they
cluster: these types of mother are “all mothers by virtue of their relation to the ideal case, where
the models converge. That ideal case is one of the many kinds of cases that give rise to prototype
effects.”44 The best example of a model, therefore, is found where all five of the definitions set
out by Lakoff are present.
This web of interconnections as the determiner of prototypicality is similar to the way
that the robin is proven to be a prototypical bird with the binary checklist. A robin is an exemplar
of the bird category because it has many traits in common with the other members of that

41 Lakoff 74
42 Though, Lakoff says, “because o f the complexities o f modern life, the models in the cluster have come to diverge
more and m ore” (75). This can be likened to Lyotard’s view o f our current society as well as the aforementioned
tendency in the sciences and in literature towards the breakdown o f the law o f non-contradiction.
43 Lakoff 75
44 Lakoff 76
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category. In the same way, the ideal ‘mother’ becomes more ideal when it shares more traits with
the different definitions of that concept. So, the ideal mother would be found at the convergence
of all the definitions, the supposed center of the cluster in the cluster model. This is why our idea
of a prototypical mother is nurturing as well as biologically and genetically connected with her
child or children, and this is where the extensions of the word mother, like the phrase ‘to mother
someone’ or the term ‘step-mother’ come from.
The concept of love, like that of the mother, cannot be described by sufficient and
necessary conditions. Even within the narrower confines of the concept of romantic love, the
concept requires multiple definitions. In order to define prototypical romantic love, one would
need a checklist of likely traits, like the checklist of traits found among birds earlier on. Traits of
ideal love could include mutual feelings, lust or desire, equal status, enduring feeling, deep
connection, and marriage, among others. These traits can be separated into several defining
models, as Lakoff’s concept of mother is separated: the mutual model, the carnal lust model, the
equal model, the enduring model, the deep model, and the marriage model. The different
concepts can also be put into a checklist form, as the traits for the category bird were:
Love Type

Mutual
admiration

Lust

Equality

Enduring
Feeling

Deep

Marriage

Then, based on the checklist table, the traits can be viewed as a series of descriptive binaries as
follows, with the first of the pair being the one which increases prototypicality and brings the
love closer to the ideal concept45: mutual love vs. unrequited love, lust/desire vs. non-

45 It is important to note the difference in the use o f the words ‘better’ and ‘ideal.’ In the context o f prototype theory,
the best member o f a category or the closest model to the ideal concept means only that that member or model is
closer to the prototype o f the category, not that that member or model is superior in any way other than in its
goodness as an example in that category.
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sexual/innocent, equal status vs. non-equal status, enduring feeling vs. temporary feeling, deep
connection vs. superficial connection, marriage vs. non-marriage. This series of binaries is
helpful in the analysis of love within Arcadia, because each type of love found within the text
can be determined as having one side of each binary, similar to the way that binaries are set up
and one is seen to be privileged in an application of deconstructionism, and from this analysis the
prototypicality of each type of love found can be ascertained.
Arcadia contains a multitude of love connections. Both in the play’s past storyline and in
the present day, the characters make unpredictable connections of romantic love that span a
multitude of types. Miller goes so far as to claim that “people make unexpected choices about
whom to have sex with, and these throw kinks in what should be a fairly predictable set of
events.”46 The non-prototypicality of the love examples revealed within the text are what
function as catalysts to move the plot forward. They are the “heat” that moves the play forward
from past to future. These love connections function as the driving force of the plot, comparable
only with the mirrored driving force of lust for knowledge.
Just as Thomasina, the novel’s heroine, discovers that “Newton’s equations go forwards
and backwards, they do not care which way. But the heat equation cares very much, it goes only
one way,”47 love is understood in a conversation between the characters of Chloë and Valentine
to be “the attraction Newton left out. All the way back to the apple in the garden.” As Chloë
says, “the universe is deterministic all right, just like Newton said, I mean it’s trying to be, but
the only thing going wrong is people fancying other people who aren’t supposed to be part of the
plan.” This “people fancying other people” is the non-prototypical love that is found throughout

46 Miller, Kristen. “From Fears o f Entropy to Comfort in Chaos: Arcadia, The Waste Land, Numb3rs, and M an’s
Relationship with Science.” Bulletin o f Science, Technology & Society. 27.1 (2007): 81-94. Web, p. 89.
47 Stoppard 87
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the text. This non-prototypical love, just like the heat that Thomasina talks about, moves only
forwards, as opposed to the rest of Newton’s proposed completely deterministic universe, which
moves both backwards and forwards. This is because atypical examples, like the nonprototypical loves shown in Arcadia tend to lead to friction, which then leads to conflict
resolution, and this results in forward plot movement. As this exception to the deterministic
universe, non-prototypical love helps to drive the forward movement of the plot.
The love between Septimus and Mrs. Chater fits most closely into the model of carnal
lust. Septimus speaks without hesitation of the lust between them, telling Lady Croom “Chater
ran me to the ground, and I being in such a passion, in an agony of unrelieved desire...I thought
in my madness that Chater with her skirts over her head would give me the momentary illusions
of the happiness to which I dared not put a face”48 In this conversation, Septimus denies the deep
model, the enduring model, the mutual model, and the marriage model of love. Thus, these
connections can be defined almost wholly by the lust model of love, with some lesser connection
to the equality model. This love, since it fits into only two of the six defined models of the love,
is fairly non-prototypical.
Septimus and Lady Croom, by contrast, seem to have a connection of mutual admiration,
since she is the happiness which Septimus cannot face, and since Septimus chooses her as one of
his two recipients of letters in the case of his death, the other being his pupil Thomasina. Lady
Croom receives Septimus’ crude description of Chater as an unusual compliment.49 There is no
overt sexual encounter between these two characters, they are not on an equal level socially, and
they are not married. Their connection, therefore, can be seen as closest to the mutual model of
love, with connection to the models of deep connection. However, neither the relationship
48 Stoppard 72
49 Stoppard 72
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between Septimus and Mrs. Chater nor the relationship between Septimus and Lady Croom can
be seen to be a prototypical version of love or close to the idealized version of love.
Within the present day of the play, the connection between Gus, the “genius” brother of
the household, who does not speak, and Hannah, one of the researchers, is the most nonprototypical example of the love found in the play. Gus loves Hannah, as is shown when Chloë
tells Hannah “My genius brother will be much relieved. He’s in love with you, I suppose you
know”50 followed by Gus presenting Hannah with an apple. This love is unrequited and innocent,
and therefore connects directly with the opposite pair in the binaries of mutual vs. unrequited and
lust/desire vs. non-sexual/innocent. The deepness of the love is not presented with any textual
support, and the love is enduring for the extent of the play, though the play covers only a short
amount of time in the present day chronology. The love is non-equal, since Gus is from a higher
class, and it falls into the non-marriage side of the binary.
Bernard and Hannah, within the present day, also provide a non-prototypical example of
love. It is non-requited, partially lustful, equal, temporary, superficial, and non-marriage.
Bernard shows interest in Hannah early on, but she rejects him coldly, and Bernard quickly turns
to Chloë.
The most central love in the play is that between Septimus and Thomasina, the play’s
heroine and the true genius. However, even this love which is more central in the play’s plot
does not show a convergence of a majority of the models set forth for romantic love. Septimus
and Thomasina share a mutual and enduring attraction and a deep connection. This is shown
through Septimus’ repeated interest in Thomasina’s ideas and his growing trust in them. By the

50 Stoppard 33
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time she is sixteen, he gives her essay “an alpha51 in blind faith.”52 However, they are not
married, nor are the two of equal status, since Thomasina is a lady and Septimus her tutor.
Thomasina is portrayed as innocent, partially because of her youth. Both times sex is mentioned
to her, her reply is “disgusting,” and she degrades Cleopatra for her sexual tendencies.

Gus and

Hannah and Thomasina and Septimus can be paralleled in some ways, since Gus and Thomasina
are both innocent geniuses. In the last scene of the text, they are paralleled in the dance of the
two couples in the same space.
The binary checklist table for the four relationships described can be written as follows:
Love Type
Septimus
and Chater
Septimus
and Croom
Gus and
Hannah
Bernard
and
Hannah
Thomasina
and
Septimus

Mutual
admiration

Equality

Lust
Y

Enduring
Feeling

Deep

Marriage

Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

As is clear, none of the four relationships described provides a clustering of a majority of the
model definitions. They do, however, represent a variance of the love models. However, it is this
non-prototypicality present in the examples that acts as the exception to the planned universe and
functions as a driver for the play’s plot.

51 In other words, a grade o f an ‘A ’ on her essay.
52 Stoppard 96
53 Stoppard 38
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Septimus and Chater, for example, are most prototypical in their lust for one another, and
the sex that they have in the play’s beginning. However, it is the lack of the other models of love
in this example that help to forward the plot. The absence of marriage, and the presence of Mrs.
Chater’s husband, lead to an argument between Septimus and Mr. Chater. Septimus also uses the
prototypical trait in this love example, the lust, not to further this love but to appeal to Lady
Croom.
Septimus and Lady Croom share an admiration that is mutual, and they fit into this
proposed model for love, but it is the lack of equality and marriage, as well as the lack of shown
sexual encounters, that further the plot. This secret love leads to Septimus’ secret love letter and
the resulting conversation between the two.
Gus and Hannah’s connection is most notable for its non-prototypicality. It contains only
one trait in the chart, and it exemplifies two opposite sides of the prescribed binary series.
However, this love is a driving force in the plot because of its atypical nature: Hannah accepts a
dance from Gus, instead of other men, particularly Barnard, in part because of the innocent
nature of the love. The unprivileged sides of the binary that are exemplified in this love example
drive the connection between the two people. The love is not only not lustful, but is purposely
innocent, since Gus does not speak and seems to have some mental disability. Again, the love
example is purposely unrequited because Hannah does not respond well to the men in the play
except to Valentine, and seems bent on ignoring all forms of prototypical love. This love that
Gus shows for Hannah, however, eventually wins her over in some small way because of the
innocent nature of Gus’ admiration, and leads to the final parallel between the two time periods.
Similarly, the unrequited love between Hannah and Bernard aids the plot structure because
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Bernard, as a result of being rejected by Hannah, is driven to be with Chloë, which in turn drives
Hannah to accept the dance from Gus.
Septimus and Thomasina’s love comes the closest to a prototypical love and to the ideal
love within the ICM models set forth. This connection provides impetus through the tension of
the non-prototypical unequal status between the two, culminating at the play’s end in Thomasina
sneaking to Septimus in the middle of the night. The prototypical aspects of this love example do
not serve to drive the plot and produce tension in the way that the inequality of status, which
leads to Thomasina’s action, sneaking into Septimus’ rooms at night, and therefore to the plot’s
biggest twist, Thomasina’s death. The innocent, rather than lustful, nature of the love as well
builds tension and leads to the secrecy that perpetuates the plot action.
Within Arcadia, the non-prototypical nature of each love example serves to further the
plot and action. This is because strange and atypical examples tend to lead to friction and conflict
and therefore to conflict resolution, which results in forward plot movement. Within Arcadia,
additionally, these non-prototypical examples of love can be paralleled with the second law of
thermodynamics, which is about the loss of heat, and which Thomasina discovers as proof that
Newton’s theory is not completely descriptive. In the same way, these non-prototypical and
therefore more unpredictable examples of love serve to break the planned, deterministic laws of
Newton’s universe and as a result to move only forward.
Conclusion
Prototype theory and deconstructionism are similar interdisciplinary theories, but the
more structured model of prototype theory allow for a closer look at some of the language
structures built into texts, especially in the text of postmodernists and language-heavy writers
like Stoppard. Prototype theory was a reaction against the classical theory and reflects the reality
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of the way that humans conceptualize categories. It, most importantly, teaches that categories
and words themselves are based on degrees of membership, meaning that one member of a
category can be a better or more prototypical example than another, and that these prototypicality
effects are based on a cluster model, where meaning is built up from a web of interconnected
linguistic and social information. Deconstructionism, a reaction against structuralism, says that
words are arbitrary and that concepts or words are composed of a chain of signifíeds, a web of
interrelated knowledge coming from both linguistic and social knowledge where the meaning is
always deferred. Derrida, the founder of deconstructionism, proposed a différence where
meaning in language is only able to be built upon the differences found. These two theories are
similar in their reactionary origins, their breakdown of binaries in both language and concepts,
and their proposal of meaning as built up from a web of interrelated knowledge. However,
prototype theory, because of its mathematical background, is able to provide a way to quantify
the differences and similarities between examples in a text; it provides a model for
conceptualization after the binary is broken down.
An examination of both theories serves to demonstrate the multiple similarities, and to
show as well the differences and limitations of each theory. An analysis and discussion of the
binaries in The Real Inspector Hound provides an example and a mirror of the binary breakdown
and re-setting up posited by each of the two theories. Finally, an application of prototype theory
to the text of Arcadia by examining the different types of love present in the text for
prototypicality draws new connections between the actions of heat and love within the text and
provides an example of a prototype theory application.
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Red is not defined by its opposite,54 green, as it would be in a binary opposition, or by the
binary set up of “red/not red” that is found in the stricter definitions of classical logic and
categorization theories. Instead the concept of red is defined by and built upon the multiple
relationships it has with other colors. Red is defined as red because it is very not like green, it
can be sort of purple, or sort of orange, it is darker than pink, etc. Red is defined by our
understanding of all other colors. Each color is therefore defined by its various relationships with
the other colors that are part of the human visual spectrum.
This perception of categorization can be extended, of course, beyond the realm of color.
Just as Derrida attempted to define concepts and words based of the connections already in place
in context, and meaning through his différence, the difference between concepts, human
cognitive categorization overall is dependent on both the relation between one object and others
like it as well as between that object and its opposite. Categorization and, by extension,
conceptualization, is dependent not only on Derrida’s différence, but on the similarities between
concepts, as proposed by prototype theory. Human categorization processes depend on this
interlocking web of relations, of the differences and the similarities between a multiplicity of
concepts, instead of on the binary understandings of older classical theory. Deconstructionism,
with its reaction against structuralism and basis of anti-order, meets well with prototype theory,
which provides a theory that is as messy as reality.
Possible avenues for further exploration on this topic would include the development and
exploration of a combination theory, where Derrida’s différance would be combined with the
buildup of meaning based on similarities between concepts that is posited by prototype theory.
The two theories discussed here would work together in tandem to re-build meaning that has

54 This opposite exists both on the color wheel and as part o f opponent process theory.
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been broken down from assumed binary constructs. Also important would be an application of
prototype theory to other texts and to other critical theories. Since prototype theory provides a
quantifying model for concepts, its application or combination with other critical theories could
further the critical reading of a text or provide more structure within that reading.
Prototype theory allows for the mess of reality because, unlike classical theories of
categorization, it attempts to describe effects of prototypicality found in the reality of human
conception and categorization. Prototype theory can both be described by literature in terms of
the breakdown of binaries and can be used as a critical lens in the text to analyze and discuss the
prototypicality effects of themes within the text in order to draw new conclusions.
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